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Abstract. Our contention is that to solve the Gettier Problem, a notion of infallible knowledge 
involving the substantial truth theory is necessary. We assume that acts of sense experience have 
propositional content, and that atomic empirical propositions need the existence of non-mental 
objects to be true. This approach allows for making the distinction between epistemically good 
justifiers and ontologically good justifiers, and leads to a definition of propositional  empirical 
knowledge free of the Gettier Problem. Our explication of the Gettier Problem rejects 
Hetherington’s (2012) view that the Gettier Problem rests on jointly unsatisfiable constraints, 
sheds a new light on Floridi’s (2004) result, avoids the Pyrrhonian skepticism, as well as the 
skepticism defended by Kirkham (1984), and vindicates the substantial notion of truth. 
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1. What is the Gettier Problem?
Gettier ([1963]) poses the question: What do we mean when we say that 
someone knows something, for example, that Smith knows that Jones owns a 
Ford? Although the Gettier type counterexamples have been familiar since the 
time Gettier’s paper was published, the Gettier Problem is not recognized in the 
same way by those who deal with it. Kirkham ([1984]) defines the Gettier 
Problem as a problem which rests on a mistaken assumption. This mistaken 
assumption consists in the attempt to find such an explication of knowledge 
which  
(i) includes all or most of the beliefs we commonly regard as 
knowledge, and 
(ii) excludes any belief which the subject does not know on that
explication, that is, is immune to all Gettier type counterexamples.  
Kirkham concludes that there is no explication which fulfills both conditions 
(i) and (ii). He argues that to get the weakest explication of “a knows that p”, 
which is immune to all Gettier type counterexamples, we must accept the 
following explication of knowledge: (1) p is true; (2) the subject believes that p; 
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and (3) justification needed for knowledge must begin from self-evident for the 
subject premises, and these premises must necessitate the truth of proposition p. 
Satisfying these conditions we fail to give such an explication of knowledge 
which includes all (or most) beliefs regarded as knowledge. Since, as Kirkham 
argues, there cannot be another explication which could be immune to all Gettier 
type counterexamples, there is no explication at all which meets parts (i) and (ii) 
of the mistaken assumption. The general conclusion of Kirkham’s analysis of 
knowledge is that most of our ordinary knowledge attributions are incorrect. 
Kirkham includes in our knowledge only a few propositions, besides necessary 
truths, such as: “I believe something”, “I think my name is Smith” (not “my 
name is Smith”), “I am in pain”, “Somebody believes something” (deduced from 
“I believe something”).1
We do not define the Gettier Problem by the two-part condition formulated by 
Kirkham. Part (i) of Kirkham’s condition is true when it is interpreted as 
a certain tendency existing at a certain period of time in a philosophical 
community. We agree that a comprehensive solution of the Gettier Problem 
should take into account most beliefs we commonly regard as knowledge. 
However, some restrictions are  necessary, since any adequate definition of 
“a knows X”, where X stands for an arbitrary belief regarded by “a” as an 
instance of knowledge, ceteris paribus is impossible. A definition of this kind 
should be formulated for a fragment of natural language. From our point of 
view, also part (ii) of Kirkham’s condition should be modified, and should be 
understood in the following way. Any adequate definition of “a knows X” for 
a given fragment of natural language is immune to those Gettier type 
counterexamples which could be formulated exclusively for that fragment of 
natural language for which a given definition has been formulated. We are 
aiming at giving a definition of this kind in the present paper. 
Kirkham gives us the following explication of self-evident proposition: p is self-
evident for the subject if and only if (i) if the subject believes p, then p is true,
and (ii) p cannot fail to be true whenever the subject believes p as subject’s 
rational reason to believe p.2 Kirkham’s explication of self-evidence allows for 
different interpretations, because the concept of evidence, as well as that of 
rationality have many different senses depending on the philosophical context. 
Since we cannot formulate any adequate definition of knowledge without the 
concept of evidence, we need to have at our disposal a satisfactory explication of 
the evidence. 
1 KIRKHAM [1984], p. 502.
2 Ibid.
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2. What is Evidence?
The word “evidence” in one of its meanings means the ground for knowledge.3
The problem connected with this meaning of evidence, which is relevant to our 
further argument, is formulated explicitly in  Davidson (1983). Davidson 
wrote: 
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations 
are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The 
answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs 
and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation 
of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified (DAVIDSON [2006], 
p. 229).
The answer to our problem must then be to find a reason for supposing most of 
our beliefs are true that is not a form of evidence (DAVIDSON [2006], p. 232).  
This view implies that sense experiences do not have propositional content, and 
if a mental state is to play the role of a justifier, it necessarily has propositional 
content. In consequence, on this view, sense experiences cannot play the role 
of justifiers, and Davidson’s argument contradicts the foundationalist account of 
justification which rests on the following thesis. 
      (F)  Sense experience is a source of  non-inferential justification. 
The foundationalist may respond in two different ways to Davidson’s argument. 
(1) He (or she) may accept the claim that sense experience does not have 
propositional content, and may reject the claim that having propositional 
content by mental states is necessary for justification; 
(2) He (or she) may accept the claim that having propositional content by 
mental states is necessary for justification, and may reject the claim that 
sense experience does not have propositional content. 
The rejection of Davidson’s claim that sense experiences are devoid of 
propositional content is supported by the theory of intentionality which states 
that mental acts, including  acts of perception, like acts of seeing, hearing or 
smelling, as well as mental acts of loving, hating, desiring, believing, judging, 
3 This meaning, besides two others, is explicitly specified in FENNELL, CARTWRIGHT [2010]), 
p. 291. I shall concentrate on this meaning, although the other meanings (leveraging and
relevance) are also widely discussed by contemporary epistemologists. Cf. ROUSH [2005]. 
I should like also to mention WILLIAMSON’s [2000] concept of evidence identified with 
knowledge.
Krystyna Misiuna 60
and (3) justification needed for knowledge must begin from self-evident for the 
subject premises, and these premises must necessitate the truth of proposition p. 
Satisfying these conditions we fail to give such an explication of knowledge 
which includes all (or most) beliefs regarded as knowledge. Since, as Kirkham 
argues, there cannot be another explication which could be immune to all Gettier 
type counterexamples, there is no explication at all which meets parts (i) and (ii) 
of the mistaken assumption. The general conclusion of Kirkham’s analysis of 
knowledge is that most of our ordinary knowledge attributions are incorrect. 
Kirkham includes in our knowledge only a few propositions, besides necessary 
truths, such as: “I believe something”, “I think my name is Smith” (not “my 
name is Smith”), “I am in pain”, “Somebody believes something” (deduced from 
“I believe something”).1
We do not define the Gettier Problem by the two-part condition formulated by 
Kirkham. Part (i) of Kirkham’s condition is true when it is interpreted as 
a certain tendency existing at a certain period of time in a philosophical 
community. We agree that a comprehensive solution of the Gettier Problem 
should take into account most beliefs we commonly regard as knowledge. 
However, some restrictions are  necessary, since any adequate definition of 
“a knows X”, where X stands for an arbitrary belief regarded by “a” as an 
instance of knowledge, ceteris paribus is impossible. A definition of this kind 
should be formulated for a fragment of natural language. From our point of 
view, also part (ii) of Kirkham’s condition should be modified, and should be 
understood in the following way. Any adequate definition of “a knows X” for 
a given fragment of natural language is immune to those Gettier type 
counterexamples which could be formulated exclusively for that fragment of 
natural language for which a given definition has been formulated. We are 
aiming at giving a definition of this kind in the present paper. 
Kirkham gives us the following explication of self-evident proposition: p is self-
evident for the subject if and only if (i) if the subject believes p, then p is true,
and (ii) p cannot fail to be true whenever the subject believes p as subject’s 
rational reason to believe p.2 Kirkham’s explication of self-evidence allows for 
different interpretations, because the concept of evidence, as well as that of 
rationality have many different senses depending on the philosophical context. 
Since we cannot formulate any adequate definition of knowledge without the 
concept of evidence, we need to have at our disposal a satisfactory explication of 
the evidence. 
1 KIRKHAM [1984], p. 502.
2 Ibid.
HOW TO DEFINE THE NOTION OF KNOWLEDGE… 61
2. What is Evidence?
The word “evidence” in one of its meanings means the ground for knowledge.3
The problem connected with this meaning of evidence, which is relevant to our 
further argument, is formulated explicitly in  Davidson (1983). Davidson 
wrote: 
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations 
are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The 
answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs 
and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation 
of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified (DAVIDSON [2006], 
p. 229).
The answer to our problem must then be to find a reason for supposing most of 
our beliefs are true that is not a form of evidence (DAVIDSON [2006], p. 232).  
This view implies that sense experiences do not have propositional content, and 
if a mental state is to play the role of a justifier, it necessarily has propositional 
content. In consequence, on this view, sense experiences cannot play the role 
of justifiers, and Davidson’s argument contradicts the foundationalist account of 
justification which rests on the following thesis. 
      (F)  Sense experience is a source of  non-inferential justification. 
The foundationalist may respond in two different ways to Davidson’s argument. 
(1) He (or she) may accept the claim that sense experience does not have 
propositional content, and may reject the claim that having propositional 
content by mental states is necessary for justification; 
(2) He (or she) may accept the claim that having propositional content by 
mental states is necessary for justification, and may reject the claim that 
sense experience does not have propositional content. 
The rejection of Davidson’s claim that sense experiences are devoid of 
propositional content is supported by the theory of intentionality which states 
that mental acts, including  acts of perception, like acts of seeing, hearing or 
smelling, as well as mental acts of loving, hating, desiring, believing, judging, 
3 This meaning, besides two others, is explicitly specified in FENNELL, CARTWRIGHT [2010]), 
p. 291. I shall concentrate on this meaning, although the other meanings (leveraging and
relevance) are also widely discussed by contemporary epistemologists. Cf. ROUSH [2005]. 
I should like also to mention WILLIAMSON’s [2000] concept of evidence identified with 
knowledge.
Krystyna Misiuna 62
hoping, and many others are intentional acts, directed at their objects.4 We
should note that the property of being directed at something is independent of 
the physical existence of the object towards which the mind is directed. In this
respect, states of knowledge and belief states differ, and only beliefs, not states 
of knowledge, can be directed towards non-existent entities. One may say that 
unlike belief reports, reports of knowledge are veridical. It is not only Davidson 
who may be regarded as a critic of foundationalism. First of all, we must 
mention Wilfrid Sellars who in his famous (1956) paper aims at giving an 
answer to the question how sense-experiences play the role of justifiers. An 
accurate account of his position may be found in Matthias Steup’s ([2001b]) 
paper which calls the problem the Sellarsian Dilemma. The foundationalist is 
faced with a choice; the sense-experiential state is either a belief, or it is not. If it 
is a belief, the question arises what could turn a sense-experiential state into 
a belief. It must be the possession of propositional content. If a sense-
experiential state has propositional content, then such a state must be another 
belief which needs its own justification, and this way, we obtain the justificatory 
regress. On the other hand, if one assumes that sense-experiential states do not 
have  propositional content, then they cannot be justifiers of any basic belief. 
Now, if we accept the position that sense-experiential states have propositional 
content, we need to argue that the presence of propositional content does not 
turn sense-experiential states into beliefs, since sense-experiential states, even 
with propositional content, are not something that can be justified. How can we 
argue that the presence of propositional content does not turn sense-experiential 
states into beliefs? Each sense-experiential state, if it has propositional content, 
is an intentional state directed at its object, that is, the proposition which has the 
same content. Note that not all intentional states possess epistemic justification; 
for example, hopes, fears and desires are intentional states of this kind. Having 
propositional content is insufficient to be epistemically justified. Matthias Steup 
gives the following argument for the claim that sense-experiential states have 
propositional content, but do not require justification.  
Suppose you ask me: What justifies you in believing that your coffee is sweet? 
This is a sensible question, and it has a sensible answer. The answer would be: “It 
tastes sweet.” But now suppose we were to ask: “But what justifies you in 
experiencing the coffee as tasting sweet, i.e. in having a sense experience that has 
as its content the proposition that the coffee is sweet?” Well, this is not a sensible 
question. If you were to ask me that kind of a question, I would have to reply that 
I don’t know what you mean. Now, what this consideration suggest is this: the 
sort of mental states that are epistemically justified or unjustified are not sense 
experiences, but rather the doxastic attitudes we form in responses to sense 
experiences. So I conclude once again that sense experiences with propositional 
4 This idea was considered by M. Steup in STEUP [2001b].
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content do not admit epistemic justification, and thus can justify without being 
justified themselves (STEUP, [2001b], p. 5). 
We regard Steup’s way of replying to the Sellarsian Dilemma as convincing and 
conforming to our view concerning sensory contents. We shall be using the 
concept of sense experience in the intentional meaning outlined above. On this 
view, sense experiences may be regarded as legitimate justifiers.5
Let L be a simple language of evidence consisting of (1) symbols for n-ary 
predicates, for an arbitrary n  N, representing natural language predicates and 
relations; (2) symbols for individual constants representing proper names, 
demonstratives and other individual terms of natural language: a, c, e (with 
subscripts, if necessary); (3) symbols for sentential truth-functional connectives 
representing natural language connectives such as “either…or” “and” and others 
if necessary; (4) symbols for time intervals: t, t’ ordered by the relation  .
Sentences formed by a predicate and individual term(s) are denoted as p, q, …, 
and a proposition that p is denoted as <p>. The proposition that p holds at t is 
denoted as <p/t>. Compound sentences built with the help of truth-functional 
connectives will be denoted as P, Q; the symbol E! stands for “exists”.
Definition 1 If “c” is an act of sense experience (act of perception) directed at 
<p> at time t, then  <p> is an epistemically good justifier of <q> in L if and only 
if person “a” believes <q/t> is true. In other words, person a’s belief in <q> at t 
is a consequence of the occurrence of the sense experience directed at <p> at 
time t. 
Example 1. Anticipating Gettier’s examples, one may say that Smith has the 
visual experience at time t <Jones drives a Ford> which is an epistemically good 
justifier for the proposition <Jones owns a Ford> if and only if  Smith believes 
that <Jones owns a Ford at t> is true. 
Suppose that Smith has the visual experience <This cube is red> when looking 
at an previously unknown cube painted white in a room where there is a red 
light-bulb in the room’s light-socket at a certain time interval t. Then <This cube 
is red> is an epistemically good justifier of the proposition <This cube is red> in 
L if and only if Smith believes that <This cube is red at t> is true. But Smith 
may know that the light in the room is red, and may formulate the content of his 
visual experience as <This cube looks red>, or as <In this light, this cube looks 
red>. Then his sense experiences individually are epistemically good justifiers of 
the proposition < This cube looks red> in L if and only if Smith believes <This 
cube looks red at t>. Definition 1 does not exclude that all Smith’s sense 
5 I shall not discuss here the problem of epistemic circularity connected with the thesis (F). A nice 
account of this problem may be found in BERGMAN [2004].
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experiences listed above are individually epistemically good justifiers of the 
proposition <This cube is white> or <This cube is green>, or even of another 
proposition. To exclude arbitrary epistemically good justifiers, Definition 1
needs a proper understanding of the subject of beliefs.  
Presupposition: We assume that the subject of beliefs is a self-conscious and 
competent speaker of his (her) native language, normally mentally developed, 
having statistically normal color vision at the time of his (her) visual experience, 
and is of a normal and undisturbed state of mind. 
Let us consider episodic mental acts such as hearings in the role of epistemically 
good justifiers. Suppose that Mary has a baby whose name is Rupert, and that at 
a certain time interval t she hears <Rupert is howling>. Her act of sense 
experience at t is an epistemically good justifier of the proposition <Rupert 
needs something> if and only if Mary believes <Rupert needs something at t> is 
true. 
How could we include testimony to epistemically good justifiers? Suppose 
Smith has been told by the president of a company that Jones is not well 
educated to get a higher post. Thus, Smith has at t the testimony <Jones is not 
well educated to get a higher post> which is an epistemically good justifier of 
<Jones is not well educated to get a higher post> if and only if Smith believes 
<Jones is not well educated to get a higher post at t> is true. Let us take another 
example.6 Suppose that Smith has been told by his cousin Ernie that the moon is 
made of green cheese, and Smith has at t the testimony <The moon is made of 
green cheese> which is an epistemologically good justifier of <The moon is 
made of green cheese> if and only if Smith believes that <The moon is made of 
green cheese> is true. We shall return to similar examples below. 
These examples appeal silently to some important ontological distinctions. They 
involve individual objects like instances of colors and instances of events which 
in contemporary ontology are most frequently called tropes, and they involve 
ontological relation of ontological dependence. A trope is an object whose 
existence is ontologically dependent upon the existence of another object. How 
should this dependence be understood?  The relation of ontological dependence 
is an essential property of a trope, and any account of this relation must appeal 
to the notion of ontological necessity, that is, de re necessity, understood as 
a consequence of the necessary structure of objects and their configurations. 
Those objects on which a trope depends are called its fundaments. Now, if an 
object has a part which is essential it is in one sense necessarily dependent on 
that part. But the fundaments of a trope cannot be wholly contained within it as 
its proper or improper parts. This requirement also excludes the case that 
6 This example has been borrowed from KIRKHAM [1984], p. 504.
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everything is its own fundament, and, in consequence, that everything is its own 
trope. Thus, tropes may be defined in the following way: T is a trope if and only 
if T exists and T is ontologically necessarily such that either T does not exist, or 
there exists at least one object O, which is ontologically possibly such that it 
does not exist, and which is not a proper or improper part of T.7 Objects 
which are not tropes are called independent objects or substances. Note that the 
relation of foundation may bind together individual objects, for example, an 
individual location and a trope, say, an instance of a particular color. These two 
individual objects are linked by the relation of mutual foundation. To give 
another example, two atoms such that atom A strikes at time t atom B are linked 
by two relations of foundation which hold between the particular event of 
striking, C, and A, and between C and B. 
3. Explanatory Role of Truth
Although Davidson did not consider himself to be a deflationist, he held the 
view  that truth is transparent.8 His view is close to the declaration upheld by 
deflationists who claim that the truth predicate is without any substantial content 
and without any substantial explanatory role, with its sole role being a “syntactic 
device”. Such a conception of truth will not be applied in the present paper. We 
need a substantial theory of truth whose main idea is expressed by the following 
assumption. 
Assumption: The sufficient and necessary conditions of truth of atomic 
propositions is the existence of entities non-reducible to our mental states.  
Example 2. Let “this speck” refers to location e1. Then the truth conditions of 
the proposition <This speck is red at t> should be formulated in the following 
way: 
<This speck is red at t> is true if and only if the location, e1, and the individual 
property of redness, e2, exist at t and are linked at t by the ontological relation of 
mutual dependence.9
These truth-conditions make use of the ontology accepting the existence of two 
kinds of entities: independent  and dependent. An individual property, being 
7 Cf. MULLIGAN, SIMONS, SMITH [1984], p. 294.
8 DAVIDSON [2006], pp. 226–227.
9 Cf. MULLIGAN, SIMONS, SMITH [1984], p. 310. The entity e which is ontologically 
independent of the entity e’ may be ontologically dependent on the entity e’’. The meaning 
of e being ontologically dependent on e’ has been given below.
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experiences listed above are individually epistemically good justifiers of the 
proposition <This cube is white> or <This cube is green>, or even of another 
proposition. To exclude arbitrary epistemically good justifiers, Definition 1
needs a proper understanding of the subject of beliefs.  
Presupposition: We assume that the subject of beliefs is a self-conscious and 
competent speaker of his (her) native language, normally mentally developed, 
having statistically normal color vision at the time of his (her) visual experience, 
and is of a normal and undisturbed state of mind. 
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true. 
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<Jones is not well educated to get a higher post> if and only if Smith believes 
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to the notion of ontological necessity, that is, de re necessity, understood as 
a consequence of the necessary structure of objects and their configurations. 
Those objects on which a trope depends are called its fundaments. Now, if an 
object has a part which is essential it is in one sense necessarily dependent on 
that part. But the fundaments of a trope cannot be wholly contained within it as 
its proper or improper parts. This requirement also excludes the case that 
6 This example has been borrowed from KIRKHAM [1984], p. 504.
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everything is its own fundament, and, in consequence, that everything is its own 
trope. Thus, tropes may be defined in the following way: T is a trope if and only 
if T exists and T is ontologically necessarily such that either T does not exist, or 
there exists at least one object O, which is ontologically possibly such that it 
does not exist, and which is not a proper or improper part of T.7 Objects 
which are not tropes are called independent objects or substances. Note that the 
relation of foundation may bind together individual objects, for example, an 
individual location and a trope, say, an instance of a particular color. These two 
individual objects are linked by the relation of mutual foundation. To give 
another example, two atoms such that atom A strikes at time t atom B are linked 
by two relations of foundation which hold between the particular event of 
striking, C, and A, and between C and B. 
3. Explanatory Role of Truth
Although Davidson did not consider himself to be a deflationist, he held the 
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and without any substantial explanatory role, with its sole role being a “syntactic 
device”. Such a conception of truth will not be applied in the present paper. We 
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Assumption: The sufficient and necessary conditions of truth of atomic 
propositions is the existence of entities non-reducible to our mental states.  
Example 2. Let “this speck” refers to location e1. Then the truth conditions of 
the proposition <This speck is red at t> should be formulated in the following 
way: 
<This speck is red at t> is true if and only if the location, e1, and the individual 
property of redness, e2, exist at t and are linked at t by the ontological relation of 
mutual dependence.9
These truth-conditions make use of the ontology accepting the existence of two 
kinds of entities: independent  and dependent. An individual property, being 
7 Cf. MULLIGAN, SIMONS, SMITH [1984], p. 294.
8 DAVIDSON [2006], pp. 226–227.
9 Cf. MULLIGAN, SIMONS, SMITH [1984], p. 310. The entity e which is ontologically 
independent of the entity e’ may be ontologically dependent on the entity e’’. The meaning 
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a trope, is an entity whose existence is essentially dependent upon that of 
another entity.10 We may define the relation of ontological dependence (OD) in 
the language of the first order modal logic in the following way.11
(OD)     e is ontologically dependent on e’: = [x(x = e)  y(y = e’)].
Individual properties and individual events are regarded as examples of 
essentially dependent entities, whereas substances are regarded as independent 
entities.12 We have to do with the ontological relation of mutual dependence of 
two dependent entities in Example 2: the location e1 and the individual property 
(trope) of redness, e2. This means that the existence of the location e1 is 
ontologically necessary for the existence of the individual property of redness, 
e2, and vice versa: the existence of the individual property of redness, e2 , is 
ontologically necessary for the existence of location e1. 
Our reasons for accepting the existence of independent and dependent entities 
are partly epistemological, because our aim is to formulate an adequate 
definition of knowledge for propositions formulated in natural language which is 
modeled by our language of evidence L.  Hence, our ontology accepts the 
existence of those entities which are recognized by the users of natural language 
without making use of any advanced language of science, like the language of 
the special relativity theory, or the language of a theory of elementary particles, 
or quantum mechanics, or another language of a scientific theory.  
What can we accept as evidence of beliefs if we assume, according to our 
Assumption, that the truth conditions of atomic propositions is the existence of 
entities different from our mental states? Founationalists claim that our sense 
experiences are evidence of our true beliefs. Does it mean that epistemically 
good justifiers defined by Definition 1 can play the role of sufficient and 
necessary condition of truth? No. Sense experiences which are epistemically 
good justifiers cannot play the role of sufficient and necessary conditions of 
truth on the ground of our Assumption. We need ontologically good justifiers
of <p> as sufficient and necessary conditions of the truth of <p/t>.  
10 Individual properties as dependent entities are called moments in MULLIGAN, SIMONS, 
SMITH [1984]. At present, the widely accepted name for dependent entities is “tropes”. Cf. 
CAMPBELL [1990], SIMONS [1994], [2000], BACON [1995], MCDANIEL [2001], TRETTIN 
[2001], MAURIN [2002], [2010], HEIL [2003], to mention only a few philosophers arguing for 
the ontology of tropes.
11 On the concept of ontological dependence cf. MULLIGAN, SIMONS, SMITH [1984], p. 294, 
and CAMERON [2008], pp. 37–38.
12 An argument for accepting the ontology of substances and tropes has been convincingly 
formulated by R. P. Cameron in CAMERON [2008].
HOW TO DEFINE THE NOTION OF KNOWLEDGE… 67
Definition 2 Entities e1,…,en are ontologically good justifiers of the proposition 
<p> in L if and only if the joint existence of e1,…,en at t is the sufficient and 
necessary condition of the truth of  <p/t>. 
If this cube is white at t, then the joint existence of this cube and the individual 
property of whiteness is the sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of 
<This cube is white at t>. The proposition <This cube is red at t> where “this 
cube” designates this cube is false, but false propositions do not have 
ontologically good justifiers. The proposition <This cube looks red at t’> is true 
and has its ontologically good justifiers: this cube, and the individual event
existing at t’ Smith of looking at this cube in the red light. 
In Example 2, the joint existence of the location e1 and the individual property of 
redness e2 is the sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of <This speck is 
red at t>. Therefore, the location, e1, and the individual property of redness, e2,
are ontologically good justifiers for <This speck is red>. In Example 1, the joint 
existence of Jones, a Ford, and the individual event of a Ford being driven by 
Jones, e3, is the sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of <Jones drives 
a Ford at t>. Therefore, Jones, a Ford (independent entities) and the individual 
event, e3, (trope) are the ontologically good justifiers of <Jones drives a Ford>. 
We claim that accepting our Assumption excludes accepting sense experiences in 
the role of ontologically good justifiers. The metaphysical status of sense 
experiences and ontologically good justifiers is different, although ontologically 
good justifiers are objects of mental acts, in particular, of the acts of 
perception.13 Thus, we have two different concepts of evidence:  
(1) The evidence given by epistemically good justifiers, (EE)  and  
(2) The evidence given by the perception of ontologically good justifiers, 
(OE). 
Sense experiences, if they fulfill the condition of Definition 1, are  epistemically 
good justifiers. The question arises if we really need the evidence given by the 
perception of ontologically good justifiers. Yes, we do. This kind of evidence 
may be properly called the ground of knowledge. We need this ground, since we 
need to formulate an adequate definition of propositional knowledge for natural 
language propositions modeled by our language L. We shall argue below that it 
may happen that sense experiences, being epistemically good justifiers, do not 
13 For a discussion of dependent entities as objects of acts of perception see MULLIGAN, 
SIMONS, SMITH [1984], pp. 304–308. Here is a passage from this discussion concerning the 
perception of individual events: “When we see Rupert’s smile, we see something just as spatio-
temporal as Rupert himself, and not something as absurd as a spatio-temporal entity that somehow 
contains a concept or a universal” (306). Cf. also SCHELLENBERG [2011].
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Definition 2 Entities e1,…,en are ontologically good justifiers of the proposition 
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guarantee knowledge, and we must take into account ontologically good 
justifiers to explain why that may happen. 
The traditional definition of knowledge formulates sufficient (if taken jointly) 
and necessary (if taken individually) conditions of knowledge in the following 
way.14
Definition 3 a knows <P> if and only if 
 <P> is true, and
 a believes <P>, and
 a is justified in believing <P>.
Gettier in his (1963) paper convincingly argues that  Definition 3 does not give 
us the sufficient condition of knowledge. Although the Reader may be familiar 
with Gettier’s counterexamples, we must describe them to make our further 
discussion easier.  
Case 1 Smith and Jones apply for a job in a company. The president of the 
company assured Smith that Jones would be chosen. Since it happened that 
Smith counted the coins in Jones’s pocket a few minutes ago, Smith has strong 
evidence for the belief (B1): 
(B1)  <Jones will get the job, and Jones has 10 coins in his pocket>. 
This proposition entails the formally correct conclusion (C1): 
(C1)     < The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocked>. 
Further facts are the following: Smith (not Jones) gets the job, and what is 
unknown to Smith, there are 10 coins in Smith’s pocket. We get then: 
(a) Smith’s conclusion <(C1)> is true; 
(b) Smith believes <(C1)>;  
(c) Smith is justified in believing <(C1)> by the closure principle 
for justification, that is, if Smith is justified in believing <(B1)>, 
and <(B1)> entails <(C1)>, then Smith is justified in believing 
<(C1)>, if he accepts (C1) as a result of that entailment.   
But it is not true in this scenario that Smith knows <(C1)>. 
Case 2 Smith remembers that Jones always in the past owned a car, and always 
a Ford. Recently Jones offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Thus, Smith 
has strong evidence for believing (B2): 
(B2)  <Jones owns a Ford>. 
Smith has also a friend Brown, but he does not know where Brown is at present. 
Next, he formulates the formally correct conclusion (C2):  
14 Cf. GETTIER [1963].
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(C2)     <Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona>. 
But facts are the following: Jones does not own a Ford, although he rented 
a Ford, and it happened – which is unknown to Smith – that Brown is in 
Barcelona. We get then: 
(a) Smith’s conclusion <(C2)> is true;
(b) Smith believes <(C2)>;  
(c) Smith is justified in believing <(C2)>by the closure principle for 
justification. 
But it is not true in this scenario that Smith knows <(C2)>. 
These two cases suggest that the traditional definition of knowledge does not 
offer the sufficient condition of truth for “a knows <P>”. We shall argue that in 
both cases Smith has epistemically good justifiers which do not guarantee 
knowledge.  In Case 1, Smith thinks about Jones as the man who will get the 
job, while the truth is that Smith himself gets the job. Smith’s conclusion <(C1)> 
is entailed by the false premise <(P1)>:  
(P1)  <Jones will get the job>. 
Smith has strong evidence to believe that the premise <(P1)> is true, but his 
evidence being an epistemically good justifier has nothing to do with the 
ontologically good justifiers of <(P1)>, which could be recognized if <(P1)> was 
true. In Case 2, Smith’s true conclusion <(C2)> is entailed by the false premise 
<(P2)>:  
(P2) <Jones owns a Ford>. 
Although Smith has strong evidence to believe that premise <(P2)> is true, and 
his evidence is an epistemically good justifier, the ontologically good justifiers 
of <(P2)>, which could be recognized if <(P2)> was true, do not coincide with 
Smith’s epistemically good justifier of <(P2)>.   
Why are Smith’s epistemically good justifiers of <(C1)> and <(C2)> in both 
cases not ontologically good justifiers? The most straightforward answer would 
be the following. This is so, because Smith’s conclusions <(C1)> and <(C2)> 
have truth conditions which do not coincide with Smith’s respective 
epistemically good justifiers. In Case 1,  the ontologically good justifiers are the 
existing non-mental entities whose joint existence is sufficient and necessary for 
the truth of <(C1)>, that is, Smith himself as employee at t’ t and 10 coins in 
his pocket at t. In Case 2, the ontologically good justifiers are the entities whose 
joint existence is sufficient and necessary for the truth of <(C2)>, that is, Brown, 
the location = Barcelona, and the individual event of being Brown in Barcelona 
at t. In both cases the ontologically good justifiers do not coincide with the 
epistemically good justifiers: Smith’s evidence that Jones will get the job, and 
Smith’s evidence that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket (in Case 1), and Smith’s 
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evidence that Jones owns a Ford (in Case 2). One may have an epistemically 
good justifier in believing a false proposition. But in the case of false 
propositions there are no ontologically good justifiers. Thus, in such cases, no
coincidence between epistemically and ontologically good justifiers is possible. 
Let us now consider Gettier’s counterexamples in our framework.
Example 3. Smith’s visual experience at t <Johns has 10 coins in his pocket> 
and Smith’s testimony at t <Jones will get the job> are epistemically good 
justifiers for <The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket> if and 
only if  Smith believes that <The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his 
pocket at t> is true. 
Example 4. The joint existence of the man who gets the job at t’  t, and the 
existence of 10 coins in his pocket at t is the sufficient and necessary condition 
of the truth <The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket at t>. Thus, 
the man who gets the job at t’ t and 10 coins in his pocket at t are jointly the 
ontologically good justifiers of <The man who will get the job has 10 coins in 
his pocket>, that is, of <(C1)>. 
Example 3 and Example 4 show that Smith’s epistemically good justifier of 
<Jones will get the job> does not coincide with an ontologically good justifier 
of <(C1)>, because Jones  the man who gets the job at t’.
Example 5. Smith’s visual experience at t <Jones drives a Ford> which is the 
epistemically good justifier of <Jones drives a Ford> coincides with the 
ontologically good justifiers of <Jones drives a Ford > , that is, with the joint 
existence of Jones, a Ford and the individual event of a Ford being driven by 
Jones at t, e3 . 
Example 6. The joint existence at t of Jones and a Ford, and the individual 
property of Jones’s being the owner of a Ford, e4 , is the sufficient and necessary 
condition of the truth of < Jones owns a Ford >, and a sufficient condition of the 
truth of <Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona at t>. Thus, Jones 
and a Ford and the individual property of Jones’s being the owner of a Ford at t
are jointly ontologically good justifiers of <Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown 
is in Barcelona at t>, that is, of <(C2)>. The individual property of Jones’s being 
the owner of a Ford at t is essentially dependent on the existence of Jones and 
a Ford at t. 
Example 5 and Example 6 show that Smith’s epistemically good justifier of 
<Jones owns a Ford> , that is, his visual experience at t <Jones drives a Ford>,  
does not coincide with  ontologically good justifiers of <(C2)>. 
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In the light of the above discussion, we have reasons to give the following 
sufficient (if taken jointly) and necessary (if taken individually) conditions for 
the truth of any proposition of our language L which stands for the schema: 
“a knows <P>”.
Definition 4 a knows < P> in L if and only if 
 <P> is true in L, and
 a believes <P>, and
 a has epistemically good justifiers of <P>, and
 a’s epistemically good justifiers of <P> coincide with ontologically
good justifiers of <P>.
It is easy to notice that Smith in the Gettier counterexamples does not know 
<(C1)> and  does not know <(C2)> if “a knows <P>” is defined by Definition 4.
As has been shown above, in both cases considered by Gettier, the condition of 
coincidence of epistemically good justifiers of <P> and ontologically good 
justifiers of <P> does not hold. 
4. A Solution
We agree with the diagnosis of the Gettier Problem which points to the lack of 
successful coordination between the truth of <P> and the subject’s justification 
of <P>. The same opinion has been expressed by  Floridi in his [2004] paper15: 
A Gettier-type counterexample arises because the truth and the justification of p 
happen to be not only independent (as they should be, since in this context we 
are dealing with fallibilist knowledge) but also opaquely unrelated, that is, they 
happen to fail to converge or to agree on the same propositional content p in 
a relevant and significant way, without S realizing it (Gettierization) (FLORIDI 
[2004], p. 64).   
Floridi makes use of the following assumptions concerning the Gettier Problem: 
(*)   the conception of knowledge occurring in the Gettier Problem is entirely 
fallibilist, 
(**)  the conception of knowledge occurring in the Gettier Problem is given by 
the traditional definition of knowledge (see Definition 3).  
15 The literature on the Gettier Problem is vast. I should like to mention only some of the earlier 
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evidence that Jones owns a Ford (in Case 2). One may have an epistemically 
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In the light of the above discussion, we have reasons to give the following 
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Therefore, Floridi’s conclusion about the logical unsolvability of the Gettier 
Problem applies to the traditional fallibilist conception of knowledge, that is, 
such a conception of knowledge for which the lack of coordination between the 
truth of <P> and the subject’s justification of <P> cannot be excluded. We agree 
with Floridi’s conclusion that the fallibilist notion of empirical knowledge 
precludes a solution to the Gettier Problem.  
Hetherington’s diagnosis (in [2012]) of the Gettier Problem also appeals to the 
distinction: fallibilism vs. infallibilism. In his view, when we try to solve 
the Gettier Problem, we have “jointly unsatisfiable constraints”, since we need to 
find a fallibilist analysis of knowledge, and retain a latent infallibilism of the 
standard interpretation of Gettier cases. Thus, Hetherington concludes: 
To solve the standardly described Gettier problem in the standardly desired way 
is impossible (HETHERINGTON [2012], p. 228). 
Fallibilism is generally understood as the view that we need not have logically 
conclusive justifications for what we know, that a justified true belief may be 
considered empirical knowledge even if we can rationally doubt it. Its opposition 
is infallibilism which is the view that knowledge is absolutely certain and it 
cannot be rationally doubted. The problem is that there are empirical justified 
true beliefs which are absolutely certain, that is, which satisfy the condition of 
infallibilism, as well as there being justified true beliefs which can be revised by 
further observations. We do not agree with Hetherington’s conclusion quoted 
above. Our contention is that for indefinitely many instances of infallible
empirical knowledge, the Gettier Problem has a solution. To make our 
discussion more perspicuous, let us define the fallibilist and infallibilist notions 
of knowledge. 
Definition 5 The fallibilist notion of knowledge: a knows <P> in L if and only if 
 <P> is true, and
 a is justified in believing <P> on the evidence <c>, and
 <P> does not need to be entailed by <c>.
Definition 6 The infallibilist conception of knowledge: a knows <P> in L if and 
only if 
 <P> is true, and
 a is justified in believing <P> on the evidence <c>, and
 <c> entails <P>.
Let us compare these definitions with Definition 4 which contains the additional 
condition of coincidence of epistemically good justifiers and ontologically good 
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justifiers. This condition tells us that we should be careful looking for evidence 
as the ground of our knowledge. We should be also careful formulating the 
content of our sense experiences, and in each case we should ask the question if 
our epistemically good evidence (EE) is ontologically good evidence (OE), that 
is, if the joint existence of entities perceived in our sense experience is the 
sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of the atomic proposition which is 
epistemically justified by the respective sense experience. In other words, to get 
knowledge we should be able to consider our justification from the point of view 
of the attributor of knowledge. Smith’s sense experience at t <Jones drives 
a Ford> is (OE) for the proposition <Jones drives a Ford>, since the joint 
existence of entities perceived at t by Smith, that is, Jones, e5, a Ford, e6, and the 
individual event of a Ford being driven by Jones at t, e3, is the sufficient and 
necessary condition of the truth of <Jones drives a Ford at t>. Table 1. below 
shows how we get knowledge from visual experience, if the condition of 
coincidence of epistemically good justifiers and ontologically good justifiers is 
satisfied. 
Table 1. The illustration of Smith’s knowledge <Jones drives a Ford> 
EE OE EE OE EE OE
<p>:=visual experience =
<Jones drives a Ford>
e3, e5, e6 entailment strict relevant entailment
Source: author coverage. 
FACT (1) 
The table illustrates the following logical relations16: 
(1)   <p>:= visual experience entails  E! e3 
(2)   <p>:= visual experience entails  E! e5 
(3)   <p>:= visual experience entails  E! e6
(4)    E! e3  E! e5  E! e6 strictly and relevantly entails the proposition 
<Jones drives a Ford at t>.
The joint existence of the individual event of driving a Ford by Jones at t, Jones 
and a Ford necessitates the proposition <Jones drives a Ford at t>, which is true 
at every time in every place, and for everyone.17 Thus, it is an instance of
infallible knowledge. Smith’s visual experience at t <Jones drives a Ford> 
entails the ontologically good justifiers of <Jones drives a Ford> whose joint 
16 “entails” means “validly deduced”. The logical form of visual experience content is regarded as 
closest to that as introduced by Davidson. See DAVIDSON [1967] and [2001].
17 Understood in that way, <Jones drives a Ford at t> is an absolute truth. For fuller analysis of the 
notion of absolute truth, see SIMONS [2003]. The concept of necessitation is discussed in 
CAMERON [2008]. Cf. also FORREST, KHLENTZOS [2000], and ARMSTRONG [2004].
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existence necessitates the proposition <Jones drives a Ford at t> . Therefore, 
Smith knows <Jones drives a Ford>, and the proposition is an instance of 
infallible knowledge. This notion of knowledge excludes the case when the 
subject has an act of sense experience in normal conditions which entails OE, 
while the proposition <p> is false. The logical consequence relation of strict 
relevant entailment excludes as illegitimate such a conclusion which ignores any 
conjunct of the premise. This explication leads to our ultimate definition of 
“a knows <P>” in L.
Definition 7 a knows <P> in L if and only if 
 <P> is true in L, and
 a believes <P>, and
 a has epistemically good evidence for <P>
 a’s epistemically good evidence for <P> entails ontologically good
evidence for <P> which necessitates the truth of <P>.
Suppose that Smith’s epistemically good evidence is his visual experience at t 
<This cube is red> in the room with a red light-bulb. Suppose that the 
proposition <This cube is red at t> is true. Then its being true entails the joint
existence of this cube, as an independent object, and the trope of redness. 
Although this cube is a part of the ontologically good evidence for <This cube is 
red>, that is, a part of the joint existence of this cube and the trope of redness, as 
well as this cube being a part of the ontologically good evidence for <This cube 
is white at t>, the whole: ontologically good evidence for <This cube is red at t> 
does not exist, because the proposition <This cube is red at t> is false. Therefore 
there is no the whole: ontologically good evidence for <This cube is red at t>, 
because the conclusion asserting the existence of the individual property of 
redness of this cube is false, and according to our Definition 7, Smith does not 
know <This cube is red >. If Smith’s epistemically good evidence at t is <This 
cube looks red>, then his evidence entails the existence of this cube and the 
existence of the individual event of Smith looking at the cube in the room with 
the red light. The joint existence of these entities is the ontologically good 
evidence for <This cube looks red at t>, which strictly and relevantly entails 
<This cube looks red>, and according to our Definition 7 Smith knows <This 
cube looks red>. Suppose now that this cube is red, and Smith’s epistemically 
good evidence for <This cube is red> is his visual experience at t <This cube is 
red> in the room with a red light-bulb, and that Smith is unaware of the fact he is 
looking at the cube in this light. His epistemically good evidence entails the 
existence of this cube and the individual property of redness of this cube, and 
the joint existence of these two entities is the ontological good evidence of the 
proposition <This cube is red at t>, therefore according to Definition 7, Smith 
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knows <This cube is red >. Even that case allows for knowledge-attribution 
without contradicting our intuitions. 
Our definition cannot be regarded as an effective criterion of knowledge. It may 
happen that the subject does not formulate the content of visual experience with 
full awareness. In such cases, our definition will not help to decide whether the 
subject knows or does not. In this respect, our definition shares the lack of an 
effective criterion of defined concept with many standard definitions of formal 
semantics. Note that Gettier’s counterexamples are formulated from the point of 
view of the attributor of knowledge, and from this perspective our Definition 7
has been formulated. 
Barn County Example. Let us consider the familiar Barn County case. Suppose 
that the landscape close to a road leading through Barn County has barn-facades 
which from the road look exactly like barns. If Henry is driving along the road 
he has each time a false belief in the presence of a “barn”, although justified by 
his visual experience. Finally, when driving along this road, it happens that he 
looks at the one and only real barn in Barn County, so this time his belief that 
this is a barn is justified and true. But in this scenario, Henry’s true and justified 
belief <This is a barn> is not an instance of knowledge. How could we explain 
the lack of knowledge in that case? 
Each time in the presence of a barn façade Henry has epistemically good 
evidence given by his act of perception, that is, by his non-veridical visual 
experience directed at <This is a barn> for <This is a barn facade>. However, in 
each case of a barn façade, his epistemically good evidence does not entail 
ontologically good evidence, that is, the existence of the barn façade on such and 
such a location and at such and such a time. In consequence, his visual 
experience <This is a barn>, although it entails E!e7 ( e7 := this barn), cannot be 
regarded as ontologically good evidence for <This is a barn façade>, and 
according to Definition 7, Henry does not know <This is a barn façade>. But if 
it is so, Henry, in the Barn County scenario, cannot make the distinction between 
his epistemically good evidence which entails the ontologically good evidence 
on the one hand, and his epistemically good evidence which does not entail the 
ontologically good evidence, on the other. In consequence, he cannot have 
knowledge of <This is a barn façade>. The lack of this instance of knowledge 
implies, on the basis of the Barn County scenario, that Henry also does not know 
<This is a barn>. If we apply our Definition 7 to this case, we get the same 
conclusion. What is the ontologically good evidence for <This is a barn> in the 
Barn County scenario? It is the joint existence of this barn and its trope of real 
existence in space and time, very roughly speaking. What is the trope of the 
real existence of this barn? The phrase the trope of the real existence denotes 
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a bundle of tropes connected with the perceptible features of this barn as well 
with its utility functions. Although Henry’s epistemically good experience 
entails the existence of this barn, it does not entail many tropes belonging to that 
bundle of tropes, and, in consequence, Henry’s epistemically good evidence 
<This is a barn> does not entail the joint existence of this barn with its bundle of 
tropes. We do not claim that Henry is not able to notice a difference between 
a real barn and a barn façade in general. We assume silently that he is able to 
make such a distinction. But in the scenario of the Barn County case, he is not 
aware of this distinction, and we suppose that Henry making it is impossible. 
Therefore, Definition 7 attributes knowledge to subjects in conformity with our 
intuitions if the subjects of beliefs satisfy the Presupposition accepted above. 
The Barn County case is illustrated by Table 2. and Table 3. below. 
Table 2. The illustration of the lack of Henry’s knowledge <This is a barn façade>
EE OE EE OE EE OE
visual experience:= <This is a barn> e 7 := this barn facade ---------------- --------------
Source: author coverage. 
FACT (2) 
 <This is a barn> does not entail the existence of this barn façade.
Table 3. The illustration of the lack of Henry’s knowledge <This is a barn>
EE OE EE OE EE  OE
visual experience:= 
<This is a barn>
The joint existence 
of this barn and its 
bundle of tropes
------------------------------ ------------------------------
Source: author coverage. 
FACT (3) 
 <This is a barn> does not entail the joint existence of this barn and its
bundle of tropes.
Whether the epistemically good evidence entails the existence of the respective 
ontologically good justifier(s), or not depends on context. Imagine that there are 
no barn-facades in Barn County at all, but the only the real barn which Henry 
perceives from the road. Suppose that Henry’s visual experience is <This is 
a barn façade>. Do we say that Henry knows <This is a barn> in this case? Of 
course, not. We say that according to Definition 7, his epistemically good 
evidence does not entail the ontologically good evidence for <This is a barn>. 
The analysis of different scenarios suggests that knowledge-attribution is highly 
context sensitive. 
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5. Conclusions
We have made use of the conception of substantial truth to explicate the Gettier 
Problem. Our definition of knowledge avoids the Gettier Problem. It defines 
empirical infallibilist propositional knowledge for the given language L which 
models simple resources of natural language, and which may serve to a certain 
degree as the ground for more complicated semantic constructions. The 
application of our definition of knowledge to the entire natural language, or to 
the entire language of an empirical science may encounter obstacles connected 
with divergent syntactic forms of natural language propositions and its semantic 
indeterminacy, the generality of scientific hypotheses, as well as with advanced 
methods of observation. But our definition applies well to less advanced parts of 
those languages. The truth and knowledge of scientific hypotheses have their 
own problems which should be left for another occasion. Concluding, we have 
reasons to claim that although our sources of knowledge are in principle fallible, 
we are neither compelled to accept fallibilism concerning knowledge, nor 
skepticism in its Kirkham version as well as in its Pyrrhonian version, meant as 
the attitude which refrains from opining about whether we can have 
knowledge.18
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a bundle of tropes connected with the perceptible features of this barn as well 
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Table 2. The illustration of the lack of Henry’s knowledge <This is a barn façade>
EE OE EE OE EE OE
visual experience:= <This is a barn> e 7 := this barn facade ---------------- --------------
Source: author coverage. 
FACT (2) 
 <This is a barn> does not entail the existence of this barn façade.
Table 3. The illustration of the lack of Henry’s knowledge <This is a barn>
EE OE EE OE EE  OE
visual experience:= 
<This is a barn>
The joint existence 
of this barn and its 
bundle of tropes
------------------------------ ------------------------------
Source: author coverage. 
FACT (3) 
 <This is a barn> does not entail the joint existence of this barn and its
bundle of tropes.
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The analysis of different scenarios suggests that knowledge-attribution is highly 
context sensitive. 
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5. Conclusions
We have made use of the conception of substantial truth to explicate the Gettier 
Problem. Our definition of knowledge avoids the Gettier Problem. It defines 
empirical infallibilist propositional knowledge for the given language L which 
models simple resources of natural language, and which may serve to a certain 
degree as the ground for more complicated semantic constructions. The 
application of our definition of knowledge to the entire natural language, or to 
the entire language of an empirical science may encounter obstacles connected 
with divergent syntactic forms of natural language propositions and its semantic 
indeterminacy, the generality of scientific hypotheses, as well as with advanced 
methods of observation. But our definition applies well to less advanced parts of 
those languages. The truth and knowledge of scientific hypotheses have their 
own problems which should be left for another occasion. Concluding, we have 
reasons to claim that although our sources of knowledge are in principle fallible, 
we are neither compelled to accept fallibilism concerning knowledge, nor 
skepticism in its Kirkham version as well as in its Pyrrhonian version, meant as 
the attitude which refrains from opining about whether we can have 
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